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4ABSTRACT
Using information on listed firms in each of the industry groups at
the two-digit level within Manufacturing this study investigates whether
the radical shift in trade policy in India in 1991 resulted in a reduction
in market power and/or an improvement in scale efficiency.  We estimate
a group-wise production function allowing for firm-specific effects.  A
plausible estimate of market power is obtained and the assumption of
constant returns to scale is mostly rejected. As regards the effects of the
trade-policy shock of 1991,  evidence of a move to a more competitive
market structure or of an improvement in scale efficiency is not
widespread across Indian manufacturing.
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5I.   Introduction
The introduction of imperfect competition into the analysis
generates gains from trade inconceivable under the standard assumption
of perfect competition1 .  Now, trade holds out the distinct possibility of
influencing market power, defined as an excess of price over marginal
cost. This occurs as the domestic price, presumably higher than the
international one due to protection, is driven downward as imports
become an option either due to the removal of quantitative controls or
the lowering of tariffs, the central features of trade liberalisation. In this
scenario, costs - determined by production relations in domestic industry
- are taken to remain unchanged, contributing to a compression of the
price-marginal-cost ratio. An altogether independent story of the
consequences of trade for market performance can be told in terms of the
Lerner index of the degree of monopoly, also known alternatively as the
mark-up or the gross margin. Recall that the mark-up is inversely related2
to the elasticity of demand and/or the number of firms in the market.
Import liberalisation may be seen as introducing greater rivalry into the
market and thus raising the industry-wide elasticity of demand. Now the
mark-up may be expected to decline, even as the number of domestic
firms remains constant.
1 See Helpman and Krugman (1989).
2 See Shapiro (1989).
6While the decline in market power emerges directly from a
consideration of economic theory, the recognition of a possible
improvement in scale efficiency due to trade has emerged mainly out of
discussions of the likely consequences of trade liberalisation, a policy
that has increasingly gained favour internationally. However, there is
no unanimity of outlook on the issue. An appraisal in Rodrik (1988)
goes: “In the presence of imperfect competition and increasing returns
to scale, trade liberalisation is compatible both with a magnification of
the welfare gains and with welfare losses. It all depends on how the
economy is expected to adjust, which in turn depends on the frustrating
ambiguities of oligopoly theory. At one extreme we could imagine that
free entry eliminates all excess profits and that liberalisation rationalizes
industry structure by reducing the number of firms and forcing the
remaining ones down their average cost curves. ……. But at the other
extreme, we can imagine a world in which the contracting sectors tend
to be those with supernormal profits and unexploited industry-wide
scale economies. The protectionists’ fears may then well be justified.”3
It is easy to see that more than the change in market power it is the
improvement in scale efficiency, both consequent upon the scaling down
of protection, that remains an empirical issue, in the sense of our having
little recourse to prediction from economic theory.
Before ending this discussion of the likely consequences of trade
reform, we would like to provide yet another mechanism by which an
improvement in scale efficiency might come about, an alternative to the
‘rationalisation of capacity’ that tends to get ignored. Note that trade
liberalisation also provides domestic firms a fresh option, other than
just introducing the threat of disciplining by increased imports. This is
3      Rodrik (1988), p. 110-1.
7that domestic firms are now enabled to compete on world markets,
conceivably due to the availability of world-class inputs at lower prices
following the reduction in tariff. Where this increased competitiveness
is translated into greater  market-access worldwide, and thus an expanded
production opportunity, we may expect an improvement in scale
efficiency. Note that this scenario depends upon production being
subject to increasing returns to scale.
The pronounced move towards more liberal trade regimes in the
developing countries from the nineteen seventies onwards inspired much
research on the consequences. Notable among these are the one on
Chile by Tybout, Corbo and de Melo (1991), Turkey by Levinsohn
(1993) and the Cote d’Ivoire by Harrison (1994). These studies have
focussed on the impact of trade reform on one or more variables among
productivity growth, market power and scale efficiency. In this paper we
investigate the impact on market power and scale efficiency in Indian
industry of a significant reversal of trade policy in 1991. We believe
that, in the context, India serves as a major test case, for three reasons.
First, economic policy has always been pursued with some vigour in
India, making the testing of its consequences - whatever the policy -
particularly relevant.  Secondly, when in India trade reform did eventually
appear on the scene of a weak-version of the Soviet model of
industrialisation under a closed foreign trade regime, it came with a
bang. For, though adopted here over a decade after it had gained
ascendancy in East Asia including China, the dismantling of quantitative
restrictions on industrial imports was brisk and the scaling down of the
tariff barrier impressive. The third reason for our belief in the relative
importance of the Indian case is purely on statistical grounds. The sheer
size of the Indian economy offers the researcher a bonus in terms of the
sample size. For instance, in certain industry groups analysed by us the
very number of firms in our sample exceeds the total number of
8observations for the same or comparable industry groups in the studies
cited above. While individual researchers can take no credit for this, the
sheer statistical advantage of large samples cannot be exaggerated.
This paper is in four sections. We first familiarise the reader with
the nature of the trade reforms initiated in India in 1991. In a subsequent
section the framework of analysis is laid out and the equation to be
estimated derived. Next we discuss our econometric strategy, present
the estimates and interpret the results. Finally, we state our conclusion.
As the preparation of the data bed is a crucial part of the exercise, the
construction of the variables and the sources of the data are discussed in
detail in the Appendix.
II.    Trade-policy Reform in India:
By any reckoning India’s foreign trade regime was severely
restrictive over the period 1947-91. Its several instruments may be
gathered under the categories ‘quantitative restrictions’ (QRs) or ‘tariffs’.
QRs ranged from an outright ban on specific imports – for instance,
consumer goods – to the ‘canalization’ of certain others – ranging from
crude and edible oils to foodgrains, mostly necessitated by the need to
maintain administered prices of these commodities within the economy.
QRs extended with near symmetry also to exports, notably foodgrains.
Further, a complex system of export promotion also existed, ranging
from Special Import Licenses for large exporters and a duty-exemption
scheme dispensing advance licenses for the import of materials and
components. When it comes to considering trade reform, as opposed to
changes in a regime of QRs, the lowering of a tariff barrier is more easy
to comprehend, which does not of course imply its being any less
restrictive due to its simplicity. In 1990-91, the unweighted average
nominal tariff was 125 percent, with a peak rate of 355 percent.
9The single most defining characteristic of the trade policy reforms
initiated in 1991 was a progressive move away from ‘quantity’ to ‘price’
controls. In the context of India’s forty-year-old trade-policy regime,
this meant a reduced dependence on QRs and an increased one on tariffs.
However, a hitherto ignored link between trade and industrial policy
now got to be duly emphasized, and tariff rates were to be progressively
reduced as part of the scaling back of protection to domestic industry.
Given the objective of this study, it may be of interest to note that the
last was seen as necessary to deliver Indian industry competitive globally.
The rate of reduction of the tariff was not uniform across industry groups,
with the rate on capital-good imports leading the way. This has led some
to point out that it had the unintended consequence of increasing the
effective rate of protection on consumer goods, the rates on which were
lowered at a slower pace.
At the end of a little over a decade since they were initiated, it is
of interest to note the government’s own view of what the trade reforms
were to achieve. It is that: “Trade policy reforms over the last decade
have aimed at creating an environment for achieving rapid increase in
exports, raising India’s share in world exports, and making exports an
engine for achieving higher economic growth. The focus of these reforms
have been on liberalization, openness, transparency and globalization
with a basic thrust on outward orientation focusing on export promotion
activity, moving away from quantitative restrictions and improving
competitiveness of Indian industry to meet global market requirements.”
(Government of India,  Economic Survey 2001-2’, p. 146.) Our discussion
of the reforms undertaken in India since 1991 is intended to be brief. A
detailed discussion, including of phases during the four decades since
1947 is provided in Srinivasan (2000). A less detailed, but more
evaluative, discussion of the measures taken since 1991 can be found in
Joshi and Little (1997).
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The dismantling of the regime of quantitative restrictions is not
easily amenable to measurement. On the other hand, we do have data on
the tariff rate applicable to Indian industry over time, for dates before
and after the onset of trade reforms in 1991. These are presented in Table
1. There tariff rates – unweighted, basic and auxiliary - and for all industry
groups at the two-digit level have been combined into average rates for
six groups. The trade-policy reforms are indicated by the faster decline
in the tariff rate since 1991.  Notice though that the reduction of the
tariff rate is not uniform across industries.  As referred to above, it appears
to have been the greatest for capital goods, here part of the group ‘Metal
Products, Machinery, Transport Equipment and Miscellaneous
Manufacturing’. However, without exception, over the nineties the
decline in the tariff rate is indeed very high across Indian industry. Data
for each industry group point to a very substantial scaling down of the
tariff barrier, enjoyed by Indian industry for over four decades. Its
consequence for industrial performance now becomes a matter of interest.
Table 1: The nominal tariff rate in India, 1987-98
Industry groups 1987-88 1992-93  1994-95 1997-98
Food,  Beverages and tobacco 126.5 76.3 44.0 35.3
Textile and Leather Products 135.4 103 59.6 40
Wood and Paper products 108.7 93.7 56.2 28
Chemical, Rubber, plastic and
Petroleum products 118.7 103.5 61.0 32.1
Non- metallic mineral products 129.7 106.9 64.2 40.1
Metal products, Machinery,
Transport equipment and
Miscellaneous manufacturing 104.6 84.0 46.7 30.1
Source: Nouroz (2001).
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In concluding this discussion we caution against the reading of
every change in Indian industry since 1991 as due to trade policy reform.
For, almost simultaneously there had taken place a substantial revision
of industrial policy in India, which too may be expected to contribute to
change. This may, however, constitute less of a problem than might be
imagined to be the case before considering the details. In our view, the
principal feature of the industrial policy reforms is the removal of
industrial licensing. At the simplest, this may be read as enabling entry
previously restricted. The pro-competition effects of this may be
considered to go in the same direction as the liberalisation of trade with
respect to import-competing sectors. It is our judgement though that, on
balance, the competition-enhancing impact of trade policy reform is
likely to be more immediately effective than that of the removal of
policy-induced barriers to entry for domestic industry. The removal of
such legal barriers to entry does not equal the removal of other,
conceivably more substantial, for example, economic ones. On the other
hand, when capacity exists overseas, imports can cross borders with
ease in response to trade liberalisation. Certainly as far as market power
is concerned the impact of trade is likely to be more immediate than that
of domestic entry, even though a variation across the manufacturing
sector may be expected with respect to this feature.
We take the view, therefore, that in the entire set of policy changes
that were put into place in India since 1991, trade reforms must count for
more than industrial policy reform as far as their relative competition-
inducing effect is concerned. This we claim on grounds that closure
remains a difficult proposition in India’s manufacturing sector, where
retrenchment and layoff of workers requires government authorization.
The removal of legal barriers to entry need not therefore imply that
economic barriers to entry have been removed, for exit as an option
cannot be assumed by the firm. Thus the pro-competition effects of
12
industrial policy changes in India are likely to have been limited, for
while they abolished compulsory licensing of capacity they did not
alter the feature that an implicit exit policy may have continued to
restrict entry. However, while the new industrial policy may have
continued to constrain competition arising out of the entry of domestic
firms, the trade policy reforms at least may be expected to have introduced
competition, prima facie and on the margin, via the threat of imports.
III.   Methodology
A methodology due to Hall (1988) has been applied with slight
modification in studies of the consequence of trade reforms for market
power and scale efficiency in several countries, notably of the Cote
d’Ivoire by Harrison (1994). In our investigation we have followed this
method closely.
Specify the production function for firm i in industry j at time t as:
(1)         Yijt = AjtfitG(Lijt, Kijt, Mijt)
where Y, K, L and M stand for output, capital, labour and materials
inputs, respectively, Ajt is an industry-specific index of Hicks-neutral
technical progress and fit is a parameter allowing for firm-specific
differences in technology. Totally differentiating (1) and dividing
throughout by Y, we have
(2)         (dY/Y)ijt = (δY/δL)(dL/Y)ijt + (δY/δK)(dK/Y)ijt
             + (δY/δM)(dM/Y)ijt + (dA/A)jt + (df/f)it.
From the first order conditions for profit maximisation of a firm in
Cournot equilibrium the expression for the marginal product(s) can be
written as:
(3a)      (δY/δL)ijt = (w/p)jt{1/[1+(sij/ej)]} = (w/p)jt µij
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(3b) (δY/δK)ijt = (r/p)jt{1/[1+(sij/ej)]} = (r/p)jtµij
(3c) (δY/δM)ijt = (n/p)jt{1/[1+(sij/ej)]} = (n/p)jtµij
where p is the product price, w, r and n are the price of labour,
capital and materials, respectively, sij is the market share of firm i in
industry j, µij is the price-marginal cost ratio and ej is the price elasticity
of demand for the jth industry .
Anticipating the estimation - which takes the form of estimating
an industry-level productionfunction - it is assumed that the mark-up
only varies across industries, implying that it is common to the firms
within the industry. Now, substituting (3a)-(3c) into (2) and re-arranging
terms, we have:
(4) (dY/Y)ijt = µj[(wL/PY)(dL/L)+(rK/PY)(dK/K)+(nM/
PY)(dM/M)]ijt + (dA/A)jt + (df/f)it.
Denoting the factor shares (wL/PY), (rK/PY) and (nM/PY) as αl, αk
and α
m
, respectively, (4) may be re-written as:
(5) (dlnY)ijt = µj[αl(dlnL) + αm(dlnM) + αk(dlnK)]ijt +
(dA/A)jt + (df/f)it.
Denoting4  the sum of factor shares under imperfect competition
as β/µ, where β is the returns-toscale parameter and β = 1 the constant
returns-to-scale case, we can re-write (5) as a growth-rate version of the
production function in intensive form in capital:
(6)              dyijt = µj[αldl+αmdm]ijt + (βj-1)(dK/K)ijt + (dA/A)jt + (df/f)it
where the variables y, l and m stand for ln(Y/K), ln(L/K) and ln
(M/K), respectively.
4 For a proof see Chambers (1988, p. 70) and Harrison (1994, p. 56).
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The term (dA/A)jt can be thought of as the rate of productivity
growth for industry j. Equally, µ is the price-marginal-cost ratio, again
common to all the firms in industry j. Were Equation (6) to be treated as
a regression, an estimate of (βj – 1) not statistically significantly different
from zero implies constant-returns-to-scale technology. Alternatively, a
statistically significant positive coefficient implies increasing returns
while a significant negative coefficient implies decreasing returns to
scale. Finally, again anticipating the econometric estimation,  (df/f)it
may be decomposed into a firm-specific-effect git and a random
disturbance term uit. In the context of panel-data econometrics there
now arises the question of whether the individual effect git is to be
treated as independent5  of the regressors (here, a firm’s inputs) or not.
We return to this issue when we discuss our estimation strategy. In any
case, the resulting specification can be used to test for a change over
time in market power µ and the scale parameter β. This may be
implemented by introducing into the regression an interactive slope
dummy applied to each of the variable input and the capital-stock terms
in (6). We would then have:
(7)       dyijt = Boj + B1jdxijt + B2j[Ddx]ijt + B3jdkijt + B4j[Ddk]ijt + gi + uit
where
B
o 
= dA/A,
B1 = µ, B2 = change in B1
B3 = (β -1), B4 = change in B3
dx = [αldl + αmdm],
dk = dK/K, and
D is a dummy accounting for the policy regime during a particular
historical phase.  Given our  interest in this study the dummy takes the
5  See Baltagi (1995).
15
value zero prior to 1991 and one from that date on. As discussed 1991 is
the year of the implementation of the trade policy reforms.
IV.    Estimation
IV.1:  The Data Base
The data for the present exercise is drawn from the database
PROWESS of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). CMIE
provide annual data on 7000 firms registered with the Bombay Stock
Exchange, limiting itself to public limited companies. Public limited
companies in India account for almost 50% of the labor force and 80%
of the fixed capital of the private sector factories, contributing to around
60% of the output and 70% of the value added. Information regarding
all the firms in all the industrial groups was collected.
No effort was made to balance the panel. Only firms for which
unacceptable values for certain variables were encountered were
excluded. The final data set as thus compiled included 3596 firms for
the ten-year period 1988-89 to 1997-98. Firms in the industry groups
chosen for the study account for nearly 73 percent of the value of output
of the manufacturing sector and approximately 70 percent of value
added in the year 1997-98, the final year for which data is available in
our sample. The distribution of firms across industry groups as arranged
for the present study along with the number of observations
corresponding to each industry group is provided in Table A1 of the
Appendix. On an average, these firms account for more than 60 percent
of the output of the corresponding industrial group reported in the
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). It may legitimately be asked why we
may not have worked with data from the ASI. In the present context, we
emphasise that we are also interested in estimating the returns to scale.
Since ASI data for the nineteen eighties is at the industry level, it is not
ideally suited for the purpose.  Being firm-level information, the CMIE
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data are preferable - though not as good as plant-level data, for returns to
scale are essentially a plant-level phenomenon. In any case, as far as we
are aware, our full sample of 3596 firms and panel of 18045 observations
spanning the period 1988-89 to 1997-98 is among the largest assembled
for the purpose thus far.
IV. 2:  Results
The estimation strategy was as follows: the basic model as
represented by Equation (6) was estimated both with and without firm-
specific effects. From the specification ignoring effects the pooled
estimator (OLS) was obtained. The fixed-effects specification was
estimated, in separate rounds, by the least squares dummy variable
approach (LSDV) and two-stage least squares (TSLS). TSLS is adopted
to tackle the potential bias arising from violation of the orthogonality
condition between the regressors and the error term. The instruments
used were the one-period lagged values of each of the two input terms.
The coefficients of the random-effects specification were estimated by
feasible generalised least squares (GLS). The statistical package LIMDEP,
Version 6 was used throughout. The results of this round of estimation
are presented in Table 2.
We took the increase in the explanatory power of the specification
allowing for individual effects to actually signal their existence.
Therefore, even though the parameter estimates do not diverge greatly
in the two instances, we now dispensed with the specification without
effects in subsequent rounds. Thus we were left with a choice among
three estimators. The TSLS estimates of the fixed-effects specification
were mostly similar in sign and magnitude to the ones obtained by least
squares (LSDV). However, when they did diverge, the level and the sign
of the estimated price-marginal cost ratio was so completely out of line
with the predictions of economic theory that we considered them
unacceptable. There is some reason to believe that this mostly reflects a
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small sample size, for when the full sample of 18045 is adopted the
coefficient estimates under least squares (LSDV) and two-stage least
squares are similar - though, the standard errors are not – as will be
noticed from Table 2.  Nevertheless, the results in the case of the
disaggregated data leave open the possibility that we may have used
inappropriate instruments. Inappropriateness of the instruments used
might arise either from their being weak in that they are uncorrelated
with the endogenous variables or from their being invalid in the sense of
being correlated with the errors. This situation is often encountered in
the estimation of production functions, and it has been argued that in
such instances the OLS estimator is actually to be preferred6 . Based on
this view and guided by the results we obtained at the disaggregated
level, the TSLS estimates were not considered by us further. The choice
was now left between the LSDV and GLS estimators, allowing for two
different specifications of the individual effects. We followed standard
practice in choosing between the fixed and the random effects models
by implementing the Hausman specification test. Results from our
estimation, including the Hausman-test statistic, are reported for each
industry group in Table 2.
Once the issue of the appropriate specification was resolved, a
test of the stability of the coefficients of the basic model as defined by
Equation 6 – amounting to a test of a change in market power and of the
scale parameter - was conducted on the specification chosen according
to the Hausman test. The regressions are not reported here to save space
(but are available upon request from the authors). Instead, a summary of
the results obtained is presented in Table 3, indicating the estimated
change in the two parameters across 1991-92 and whether this is
statistically significant.
6 See Basu and Fernald (1997).
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Table  2 : Production function estimates for Indian Industry
                   regression :  dyijt = Boj + B1jdxijt + B2jdkijt + uit
Effects  → None                 Fixed Random
Estimator  →     OLS  LSDV TSLS GLS
Food Products
B0 0.02 0.03
(8.3) (5.8)
B1 1.07 1.05  1.31 1.06
(91.9) (86.8) (10.9) (91.7)
B2 -0.23 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
(-15.7) (-16.5) (-0.7) (-16.7)
R2 0.86 0.91 0.86
Hausman (χ2)   = 6.38
Beverages & Tobacco
B0 0.01 0.02
(2.9) (3.0)
B1 1.18 1.03 1.10 1.13
(34.9) (27.2) (5.1) (34.4)
B2 -0.39 -0.37 -0.30 -0.32
(-11.3) (-13.9) (-2.12) (-12.9)
R2 0.94 0.96 0.93
Hausman (χ2) = 29.10
Textiles
B0 0.01 0.01
(5.5) (4.8)
B1 1.19 1.16 0.96 1.19
(113.6) (91.5) (2.6) (107.1)
B2 -0.16 -0.19 0.02 -0.17
(-14.3) (-14.6) (-0.03) (-14.6)
R2 0.90 0.93 0.90
Hausman (χ2) = 8.69
Textile Products
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B0 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.8) (-0.1)
B1 1.31 1.27 1.10 1.30
(69.0) (60.8) (0.9) (68.60
B2 -0.05 -0.04 0.13 -0.04
(-2.6) (-1.7) (0.1) (-2.2)
R2 0.91 0.95 0.91
Hausman (χ2) = 16.6
Leather
B0 -0.0004 -0.001
(-0.03) (-0.03)
B1 0.92 0.84 0.72 0.89
(16.0) (14.5) (0.6) (16.2)
B2 -0.19 -0.29 0.28 -0.25
(-2.0) (-3.0) (0.2) (-2.7)
R2 0.71 0.86 0.71
Hausman (χ2) = 4.95
Wood
B0 -0.03 -0.02
(-2.1) (-1.4)
B1 1.40 1.39 -3.2 1.39
(11.8) (10.4) (-0.1) (11.1)
B2 0.12 -0.06 -2.7 -0.01
(0.1) (-0.5) (-0.2) -(0.1)
R2 0.69 0.73 0.69
Hausman (χ2) = 1.25
Paper
B0 0.02 0.03
(7.2) (6.4)
B1 1.29 1.26 0.22 1.28
(63.7) (53.0) (0.02) (63.0)
Effects  →       None                Fixed Random
Estimator  →     OLS     LSDV      TSLS   GLS
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B2 -0.26 -0.30 -0.68 -0.27
(-11.8) (-12.5) (-0.3) (-12.3)
R2 0.92 0.94 0.92
Hausman (χ2) = 9.49
Rubber
B0 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.6) (-2.3)
B1 1.11 1.10 0.87 1.11
(63.9) (52.9) (0.80 (60.8)
B2 -0.20 -0.20 -0.56 -0.19
(-10.4) (-9.2) (-0.4) (-9.8)
R2 0.85 0.89 0.85
Hausman (χ2) = 1.97
Chemicals
B0 -0.004 -0.002
(-2.3) (-1.1)
B1 1.28 1.27 1.03 1.28
(128.1) (109.2) (1.3) (122.7)
B2 -0.06 -0.07 -0.24 -0.07
(-6.30) (-6.1) (-0.4) (-6.2)
R2 0.87 0.90 0.87
Hausman (χ2) = 1.90
Non-Metallic mineral products
B0 0.01 0.01
(2.1) (1.5)
B1 1.48 1.46 1.39 1.48
(53.1) (46.9) (3.2) (51.4)
B2 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 -0.19
(-6.6) (-5.7) (-0.11) (-6.2)
R2  0.77 0.82 0.77
Hausman (χ2) = 4.19
Effects  →       None                Fixed Random
Estimator  →     OLS     LSDV      TSLS   GLS
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Basic metals
B0 0.02 0.02
(10.2) (7.4)
B1 1.23 1.21 -3.40 1.22
(114.6) (102.5) (-0.01) (110.4)
B2 -0.09 -0.12 -15.10 -0.11
(-7.7) (-8.9) (-0.1) (-8.4)
R2 0.90 0.93 0.90
Hausman (χ2) = 8.39
Metal Products
B0 0.02 0.02
(5.5) (3.2)
B1 1.25 1.21 1.11 1.22(60.8) (61.2) (3.90 (63.5)
B1 -0.08 -0.13 -1.04 -0.12(-4.1) (-6.6) (-0.5) (-6.2)
R2 0.90 0.94 0.89
Hausman (χ2) = 9.26
Machinery
B0 0.01 0.01(4.80) (3.20)
B1 1.26 1.25 1.35 1.25(99.0) (93.2) (4.1) (98.2)
B2 -0.12 -0.13 0.22 -0.13(-9.5) (-10.7) (0.10) (-10.5)
R2 0.82 0.89 0.82
Hausman (χ2) = 4.43
Transport
B0 0.02 0.02(8.1) (7.1)
B1 1.25 1.23 1.78 1.25(60.1) (55.2) (2.3) (55.6)
Effects  →       None                Fixed Random
Estimator  →     OLS     LSDV      TSLS   GLS
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B2 -0.19 -0.20 -0.26 -0.19
(-10.2) (-9.6) (-1.0) (-10.1)
R2 0.82 0.86 0.82
Hausman (χ2) = 2.59
Miscellaneous
B0 0.01 0.01
(1.3) (1.1)
B1 1.07 1.08 1.00 1.07
(25.6) (19.6) (2.8) (25.6)
B2 -0.16 -0.12 0.28 -0.16
(-2.5) (-1.7) (0.15) (-2.5)
R2 0.85 0.89 0.85
Hausman (χ2) = 0.67
Manufacturing
B0 0.01 0.01
(12.5) (8.9)
B1 1.19 1.18 1.11 1.19
(276.7) (245.8) (5.7) (267.1)
B2 -0.15 -0.17 0.12 -0.16
(-32.3) (-33.3) (0.1) (-33.4)
R2 0.86 0.90 0.86
Hausman (χ2) = 31.26
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Effects  →       None                Fixed Random
Estimator  →     OLS     LSDV      TSLS   GLS
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We discuss the results of our econometric investigation in two
rounds. First we comment upon the coefficient estimates; then we discuss
the results of the test for their stability across policy regimes occurring
in 1991.
Estimates of both the coefficients in the basic model are of interest
to us. The first, being the price-marginal cost ratio, is the standard indicator
of market power and the second, being the scale parameter, casts light
on the technical production conditions in Indian industry. It may be
noted that the implied mark-up is greater than one for every industry
excepting ‘Leather’. We find this unusual in terms of the prediction
from economic theory. The production function for this industry group
was now re-estimated with a different instrument set, but the coefficient
value did not alter much. We only note that price-cost ratios of less than
one may be found in earlier studies for both India and other countries7 .
As regards the estimates of the scale parameter, the coefficient on the
capital stock variable is mostly statistically significant. Thus, we find
constant returns to scale rejected for all the industries other than ‘Wood’
and ‘Textile Products’. In all instances, the estimated coefficient is
negative, signalling production to be taking place under decreasing
returns-to-scale. It should be noted here that most of the recent studies
of Indian industry report departures from constant returns to scale8 .
The results of our investigation of the stability of the coefficients
of the basic model are summarised in Table 3. We comment first on the
results for the price-marginal cost ratio. From the results obtained at the
7 Klette (1999), Krishna and Mitra (1998) and Harrison (1994) too report
price-marginal cost ratios of less than one for certain industries.
8 Srivastava(1996) and Mamgain (2000) report either decreasing returns to
scale or constant returns to scale for most of the industries. Interestingly,
Mamgain argues “Given the bureaucratic procedures which govern the
start up and expansion of a business in India one would have expected to
see more evidence of decreasing economies of scale” (Mamgain 2000,
p.61).
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disaggregated level, we may speak of a mixed picture, with no change
in seven out of the fifteen industry groups.  Of the eight industries for
which we find a statistically significant change, the ratio increases in
five cases and declines in three. Thus evidence of a move to a more
competitive market structure is scarce. On balance, our results point to a
move to a less competitive one. Turning to the test of stability of the
scale parameter – again at the disaggregated level – the results are less
mixed than in the case of the price-cost ratio. Here, in nine cases out of
fifteen, a clear majority, we find no change. Out of the six instances of a
recorded change, there is an improvement in scale efficiency in four,
with the two others showing a worsening. Of the four industries where
there is an improvement in scale efficiency, for ‘Basic Metals’ the results
indicate a move to increasing returns to scale9  post-1991. A scenario
under which this can be brought about following trade liberalisation
was discussed in the Introduction.
When we now look at the estimates for the full sample of firms
across the industry groups – designated ‘Manufacturing’ – there is a
statistically significant change in both the parameters consequent upon
the trade reform. What is recorded is an increase in both the price-marginal
cost ratio and an improvement in scale efficiency. This of course reflects
fairly closely the distribution of results at the disaggregate level.
In our view, there is no ‘correct’ reading of the results reported
here. We propose the following reading. The estimates for
‘Manufacturing’ give us a picture of what is happening within Indian
industry. However, partitioning the data into the various industry groups
reveals very great heterogeneity across them. We therefore draw attention
to both the sets of results.
9 This is deduced from the magnitudes of B3 and B4 in an estimate of
Equation 7. The estimates, are not presented here to save space, are available
from the authors upon request.
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It is of interest to compare the results here to those of other studies
of the effect of trade liberalisation in India and elsewhere. In a study of
Chilean manufacturing over the years 1967 and 1979 Tybout et al find
that there is “... no evidence of overall improvements in productive
efficiency for the manufacturing sector”10 , with estimated returns to
Table  3: Estimated change in market power and scale efficiency
Regression: (dy)ijt = Boj + B1jdxijt + B2j[Ddx]ijt + B3j dkijt+ B4j [Ddkijt  ]+ uit
D = 0 for year < 1991-92 else D=1
Industry   Price-Marginal Scale Parameter
Cost Ratio
Food products   +* +*
Beverages and Tobacco + +
Textiles - +
Textile products - -
Leather - +
Paper - +
Wood - -
Chemicals +* +*
Rubber, plastic and
petroleum products -* -*
Basic metals +* +*
Non-Metallic minerals +* +
Metal products +* +
Machinery -* -*
Transport -* +*
Miscellaneous - -
Manufacturing Total +* +*
* statistically significant at 5%.
10 See Tybout et al (1991) p. 241.
26
scale higher in less than 50 percent of the industries studied. Our
estimates for India are in line with this finding. Tybout et al do not
investigate the behaviour of the mark-up across policy regimes. On the
other hand, Harrison’s study of the Cote D’Ivoire does; however, she
reports a statistically significant decline in the mark-up in only one out
of nine industries post-trade-reform. Harrison was not concerned with
changes in scale efficiency. Immediate interest, though, must focus on
how the results here relate to those of a study of Indian manufacturing
by Krishna and Mitra (1998), who using an identical methodology
investigate the behaviour of mark-ups and of scale efficiency. Some
differences between the two studies may, however, be noted. Krishna
and Mitra focus on five industries over the period 1985-1993, reporting
the results for four. Our study covers a different period, being the years
1987-8 to 1997-8 and covers the entire manufacturing sector. Krishna
and Mitra experiment with alternative cut-off dates to divide their sample
into pre-and postliberalisation periods. For the case, where this date is
the same as in our study, i.e., 1991-92, there is similarity between our
results and those of Krishna and Mitra for some sectors but not others.
However, it maybe stated that we do not find anything like the almost
across-the-board reduction in mark-ups that these authors find for their
chosen set of industries when we investigate the issue for all the industry
groups at the two-digit level. At the same time, neither do we find a
worsening of scale efficiency across the board as reported by them.
Having compared our findings to those of other important studies
on the impact of trade on market power and/or scale efficiency
internationally, we consider it appropriate to make an observation
regarding the database of our study in relation to these. First, we have
used a continuous panel in this study as opposed to comparing parameters
of interest at different points of time as do Tybout et al. The sample size
27
is another issue. Quite often, there are more firms in each industry studied
here than there are number of observations in the Harrison study. This,
of course, has to do with the fact that India has a much larger economy
but, as we mention in our introduction, the statistical advantages of
sample size cannot be overlooked. Finally, in comparison with Krishna
and Mitra we look at a longer period since the onset of liberalisation
and, while adopting the entire range of industries in Indian
manufacturing, also work with a more acceptable data base with regard
to the construction of the capital and labour inputs, of which readers are
invited to make a comparison.
V.    Conclusion
The consequences of trade reform for Indian industry may be
considered to be a matter of some interest for reasons that we have
already discussed at the beginning of this paper. Indeed it should prove
of interest to both international-trade theorists and to those economists
exclusively interested in the outcome of trade liberalisation as a policy
adopted internationally since the late seventies. We have found a less
than widespread and non-uniform impact on industry of trade reforms in
India. While evidence of an improvement in scale efficiency is likely to
attract little extra attention, for a priori it may be viewed as an entirely
empirical issue, the finding of an increase in market power may evoke
some surprise if one is to go entirely by the prediction of mainstream
economic theory. However, we are able to offer two explanations of the
finding of an increase in the price-marginal cost ratio since trade reforms
in India. First, we may visualise a decrease in the number of domestic
firms consequent upon what has been referred to as the ‘rationalisation
of industry structure’, originally seen as the route to an improvement in
scale efficiency and actually signalled by our results to have taken
place in Indian industry since 1991. With the mark-up inversely related
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to the number11  of firms, a decline in its level may be expected to follow.
Secondly, outside the mainstream theory of market structure we may
visualise trade liberalisation setting-off increased rivalry, which is what
‘competition’ is in the Austrian sense. Once again the field may be
expected to be left with fewer firms post-reform, with the predictable
consequence for the mark-up.
1 1 Some independent evidence – even though at a level far more disaggregated
that that of our data - of increasing concentration, as captured by the
Herfindahl index, since 1991 is to be found in the annual report ‘Industry:
Market Size and Shares’, Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy from
where the data for this study has been drawn.
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Appendix
I.     The number of firms and the number of observations, by industry
group, are provided in  Table A1.
Table A1
Industry: Firms Observations
Food products 413 1786
Beverages and Tobacco 55 272
Textiles 402 2082
Textile products 160 604
Leather 38 129
Paper 114 569
Wood 15 74
Chemicals 609 3154
Rubber, plastic and
petroleum products 271 1225
Basic metals  406 2145
Non-Metallic minerals 213 1097
Metal products 135 694
Machinery 561 3024
Transport 170 1065
Miscellaneous 34 125
Manufacturing 3596 18045
II.    The Construction of variables:
As the balance-sheet data is provided by the CMIE was in nominal
terms, the conversion of these values into a measure of the underlying
quantities was the principal data processing involved in the estimation
of a production function. This involved deflating these nominal values
using appropriate prices. We discuss the procedure in detail.
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Output:  CMIE provide information on the value of output of
firms. This was deflated by the industry-specific wholesale price index.
The source of price index is “Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices in
India, base 1981-82=100”, Ministry of Industry, Government of India.
Capital:  One needs a measure of capital. While we are aware of
the debates with regard to the measurement of capital, we believe that
the procedure followed here lives up to the task to the extent of providing
a reasonable estimate of the real capital stock. When some authors,
Krishna and Mitra (1998) for instance, use as their measure of capital the
net value of fixed assets deflated by some investment-goods deflator
they ignore vintage. On the other hand, we follow Srivastava (1996) in
attempting a measure of the firm-specific capital stock allowing for
considerations of vintage.
Our data base, CMIE,  provides information, from balance sheets,
on gross fixed assets and its components along with depreciation. From
this, investment can be obtained as the difference between the current
and lagged values of assets. In principle, this enables one to use the
perpetual inventory method to arrive at an estimate of capital stock for
each year as follows:
Pt+1 Kt+1 = [Pt+1/Pt].PtKt(1- δ) + Pt+1It+1,
where P, K and I refer to the price, physical capital stock and
investment, respectively, while δ  is the depreciation rate.
However, this procedure can be applied as it is only when the
base-year capital stock is P0K0, i.e., in the chosen base year a firm has no
inherited capital, as it were. But this is seldom the case, for in any
particular year a firm has a mixture of vintages, and, in the context of
balance-sheet data, all valued at historic cost. The problem of arriving
at a measure of the real capital stock using the perpetual inventory
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method is really one of valuing the base-year capital stock. It is
essentially a question of converting balance-sheet data at historic cost
into a measure of capital at replacement cost, while at the same time
accounting for the vintage mix. The value of capital at replacement cost
for the base year is arrived by revaluing the base year capital as found in
the balance sheet. The method adopted for this involves an element of
arbitrariness, and one at best arrives at an approximation. In constructing
a ‘revaluation factor’ we depended upon the following three assumptions:
(a) We treated 1997-98 as the base year, for the maximum number
of observations in our sample corresponded to this year. We assume that
the earliest vintage in the capital mix dates to either the year of
incorporation or 1977. The year 1977 is adopted on the basis of the
Report of a Census of Machine Tools, Central Machine Tools Institute,
Bangalore, 1986, which states that the life of machinery in India is on
average of the duration of twenty years.
(b)  The price of capital changes at a constant rate from 1977 or
the year of incorporation upto1997. The actual value adopted is arrived
at from a series of price deflators constructed from the CSO’s estimate of
gross fixed capital formation published in the National Accounts
Statistics.
(c)  As with the price of capital, we assume that investment in a
firm grows at a constant rate too. The growth of fixed capital formation
at 1980-81 prices is applied for all the firms. Depending on the year of
incorporation, firms will have different annual average growth after
1977.
The resulting revaluation factor was applied to the capital stock
at book value in the chosen base year, converting it into the capital
stock at replacement cost. This value was then deflated,  to arrive at the
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real capital stock for that year. The price deflator used was the price
index for Machinery and Machine Tools, as plant and machinery account
for 71.5 percent of GFA12 . Investment, arrived measured as (GFAt - GFAt-
1) is now added to the estimated real capital stock in the base year to
arrive at the figure for year one. The capital stock series is now updated
using the perpetual inventory method. The estimation procedure is
outlined here very briefly. It is elaborated upon in Srivastava (1996).
It should be noted that we use the gross value of capital in our
study. Many authors use gross value, as the estimated net value is found
to decline more rapidly than warranted by the facts, for in actuality
capital goods are often maintained in a good condition until firms scrap
them. However, use of the gross value involves a stringent assumption
that the ability of a capital good to contribute to production remains
constant throughout its economic life. Dennison (1967) thus argues
that a correct measure of capital services falls somewhere in between the
gross stock and the net stock advocating the use of a weighted average
of the two with higher weight for the gross stock as the true value is
expected to be closer to it. An attempt at implementing this runs into
trouble in the Indian context as a measure of capital consumption is
difficult to arrive at. Even when some of the arbitrariness in arriving at a
depreciated capital stock may be overlooked, the data requirements are
more demanding than what is available currently. We thus preferred to
work with the gross value of capital.
Labor: The item ‘Wages and Salaries’ is converted into a measure
of labor input of firms by administering an estimated Compensation per
Worker in the industry in that year. The resulting measure is often referred
to as the labor input expressed in ‘efficiency units’13 . The average
1 2 According to Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, 1990.
1 3 See Tybout et al (1991), p. 245.
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Compensation per Worker was computed by dividing Total Emoluments
by Total Labor Hours as reported in the Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI).
Materials: The materials bill is deflated by a materials-input price
index. Input-Output coefficients for 1989-90 have been used as weights
to combine the wholesale prices of the relevant materials. The source of
the weights is CSO’s input-output table for 1989-90 and appropriate
price indices were taken from “Index Numbers of Wholesale Prices in
India, base 1981-82=100”, Ministry of Industry, Government of India.
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